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STANDING OF THE TERMINATED EMPLOYEE UNDER
SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Federal antitrust laws provide a dual system of enforcement by
allowing both criminal and civil actions.1 In civil litigation, treble
damages provide an effective means of enforcing the antitrust
laws.2 Section 4 of the Clayton Act' allows plaintiffs to recover
treble damages for an injury to "business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."'4 In addition to its im-
portant compensatory function, an award of treble damages penal-
izes wrongdoers and deters future misconduct. The punitive and
deterrent functions protect competition, thus fulfilling the primary
purpose of the antitrust laws.
Although the courts have attempted to identify proper plaintiff
classes in antitrust suits,6 the identification process is difficult.'
1. Criminal penalties are provided in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). Section 4
of the Clayton Act allows civil actions in which successful plaintiffs may recover treble dam-
ages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809 n.1 (1977). The United States Supreme Court also has recognized the value of
treble damage suits. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 485
(1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life Mufflers v. Interna-
tional Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. Id.
5. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977). See also Berger &
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 809, 810 & nn.2-3.
6. The courts have identified direct and indirect purchasers, competitors, producers, and
consumers as proper plaintiff classes.
7. A plaintiff must establish standing to maintain a private antitrust action. The doctrine
of standing, as applied to antitrust actions, allows plaintiffs whose injuries are the result of
the defendant's anticompetitive conduct to sue for treble damages, and is similar to the tort
concept of proximate cause. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 811. See, e.g., Karseal
Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363 (9th Cir. 1955) (describing the standing test
as a test of proximate causation). Standing is analytically distinct from the statutory re-
quirements of § 4 of the Clayton Act, but courts have not observed the distinction in all
cases. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 811 & n.8. The analysis of standing in an anti-
trust suit is also distinct from the constitutional analysis of standing. The threshold inquiry
for determining constitutional standing is injury in fact. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975). By alleging the statutory requirement of injury to business or property, the
antitrust plaintiff moves beyond the constitutional standing issue to the substantive anti-
trust standing issue. See Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1148 (6th Cir. 1975).
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Recently, courts have considered whether discharged employees
have standing to maintain treble damage suits under section 4 of
the Clayton Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit in In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigations and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe v.
H.S. Crocker Co.9 considered whether employees who were dis-
charged for refusing to participate in their employers' anticompeti-
tive activities had standing to bring treble damage actions against
their employers. Both decisions focused on the policies10 underly-
ing section 4 and the nature of the discharged employees' inju-
ries.11 The courts, however, reached opposite conclusions.12
Although the policies behind the antitrust laws and the judicial
concept of antitrust injury s appear to present distinct areas of in-
quiry, they involve similar considerations. The purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to further competition by protecting the free market
system. Courts have allowed consumers to seek remedies under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, therefore, because consumers are
often the victims of anticompetitive activity. 4 This adaptation of
the antitrust laws serves the deterrent and compensatory purposes
of the treble damage provision while furthering the antitrust laws'
procompetitive policy.15
This Note examines the standing of terminated employees to
maintain section 4 treble damage actions and concludes that em-
ployees terminated for refusing to participate in antitrust viola-
8. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 103 S.
Ct. 1261 (1983).
9. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983). The Supreme Court
remanded Ostrofe for reconsideration in light of Associated Gen. Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983). See infra note 49.
10. See In re Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519-20; Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1383-86.
11. See In re Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 516-17; Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1386-88. See also
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
12. The Seventh Circuit in In re Industrial Gas found that the employee did not have
standing, 681 F.2d at 520, but the Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe allowed the plaintiff to maintain
a treble damage action, 670 F.2d at 1386.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
14. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Os-
trofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244
(1983). See also Comment, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 570, 571 (1964).
15. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977).
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tions do not have standing to sue for treble damages."' A discharge
from employment is not the kind of injury that the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent. Neither the policies underlying treble
damage antitrust actions nor the nature of the discharged employ-
ees' injuries justifies an extension of antitrust standing to termi-
nated employees.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON
ACT
An important policy consideration underlying section 4 is the
need to provide an effective means for private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. 17 As "private attorneys general," plaintiffs can en-
force the laws, deter future anticompetitive conduct, and recover
compensation for their injuries. Because the predatory nature of
antitrust violations allows violators to reap profits through price-
fixing or overpricing, the most effective method of enforcing the
law is to allow the injured party to sue the violator directly.' 8
Courts measure damages by the profits that the violator unjustly
acquires from his anticompetitive activities. By trebling the dam-
ages, private suits raise the cost of a violation beyond the profit
margin and deter future misconduct by increasing the risk associ-
ated with anticompetive acts. Additionally, the prospect of recov-
ering treble damages provides a financial incentive for injured par-
ties to challenge large corporations in lengthy antitrust litigation. 9
The countervailing policy considerations are those common to all
cases involving potentially complex litigation. Antitrust defendants
need protection against exposure to multiple liability for a single
wrongful act. An award of treble damages may destroy the anti-
trust violator financially by recapturing more than the illicit prof-
16. In Note, Employee Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 81 Mich. L. Rev.
1846, 1847, 1860-66 (1983), the author reaches an opposite conclusion by following a policy
analysis similar to the Ninth Circuit's approach in Ostrofe.
17. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977); see also Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). Legislative history indicates that the primary
purpose of § 4 is remedial. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477
486 n.10 (1977) (summarizing the legislative history of § 4).
18. See In re Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 520; Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1383.
19. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust In-
jury, 47 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 467, 472, 474-75 (1980).
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its. Courts also have a strong interest in protecting the recoverable
funds for the greatest number of potential plaintiffs.20 Finally,
courts must be concerned with the administrative difficulties in-
herent in opening the floodgates of potentially unlimited treble
damage litigation.21
These countervailing policies become more significant as courts
recognize additional classes of potential antitrust plaintiffs. If one
consumer recovers treble damages from a supplier who has illegally
overcharged for the goods he has sold, for example, a wave of simi-
lar suits might follow. Therefore, a court's determination of stand-
ing in a particular case may have broad implications for other simi-
larly situated parties.22 Because of these precedential effects,
courts are wary of allowing section 4 actions by new classes of
plaintiffs. Decisions in which the courts have addressed the stand-
ing of terminated employees to sue for treble damages reflect judi-
cial awareness of these conflicting concerns.
ANTITRUST INJURY AND ANTITRUST STANDING
Antitrust violations produce a variety of injuries, but not all in-
jured individuals may sue for treble damages.23 To limit the poten-
tially unmanageable number of treble damage actions, courts have
developed antitrust standing doctrines which limit the right to sue
to those persons that Congress intended to recover under section
4.24
Confusion currently characterizes the antitrust standing doc-
20. Similar problems arise in other complex suits, such as mass tort litigation. Class ac-
tions, interpleader, and joinder are useless if a recovery by a prior plaintiff has exhausted
available funds or if potential claims have forced the defendant to seek the protection of the
bankruptcy laws. The Johns-Manville asbestosis litigation is a striking example.
21. E.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S.
Ct. 1244 (1983).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
23. Potential plaintiffs must meet the statutory qualifications of an injury-in-fact to a
business or property interest. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d 514, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub noma. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983); Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker
Co., 670 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Morgan v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calderone Enters. v. United Art-
ists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
See also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 812.
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trines. The lower federal courts do not apply any single test, nor do
they apply the standards consistently.2 The basic concept of
standing in treble damage actions is that the plaintiff must have
suffered a direct injury by reason of the antitrust violation.2 Al-
though no single method has emerged for determining whether a
plaintiff has suffered a direct injury and whether he, therefore, has
standing to sue for treble damages,27 at least four broad tests have
found general acceptance.28
Tests for Determining Antitrust Standing
The target area test29 examines the economic area affected by
the defendant's anticompetitive conduct. To provide standing, the
25. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 820-35. See, e.g., Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1382 & n.7;
In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 127-28.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). One study has described the direct injury
rule as "the illegitimate offspring 8f two early private antitrust cases," Ames v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909), and Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704
(3d Cir. 1910). Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 813-14. Berger and Bernstein cite the
direct injury rule as the cause of chaos in antitrust standing. Additionally, they find that the
analytical methods applied by courts in determining direct injury-especially the practice of
categorizing plaintiffs by class, or of examining the violator's target area-inadequately ex-
press the concerns supporting the standing doctrines. Although a new approach to the
standing question would provide an opportunity for a more logical and uniform analysis,
courts probably will not abandon the direct injury rule, especially in light of the Supreme
Court's recognition of the direct-indirect injury dichotomy. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The Su-
preme Court has not clarified the standing analysis and has cited cases applying a variety of
tests, often at odds with each other. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972). See also In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 126-27 & n.7 (reviewing a variety of approaches used in
the lower federal courts and attempting to categorize the approach of each circuit).
27. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 125. See also Berger & Bern-
stein, supra note 2, at 820.
28. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 n.12 (1982); In re Industrial Gas Antitrust
Litigation, 681 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bichan v. Chemetron
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
29. See, e.g., Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Engine Specialties v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1979), aff'd per curiam on reh'g, 615 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980);
Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Calderone Enters. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930
(1972); Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 923 (1971); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir.
1966); Warner Mgmt. Consultants v. Data Gen. Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 545 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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plaintiff's business or property injury must be within the area of
the economy threatened by the breakdown of competition." Inci-
dental harm does not warrant the plaintiffs recovery of treble
damages because only parties whose economic interests immedi-
ately suffer from the defendant's anticompetitive activities have
standing to sue.31 Under the target area test, for example, farmers
who claimed that automobile pollution reduced their crop yields
did not have standing to sue automobile manufacturers for an al-
leged antitrust conspiracy to suppress the development of pollu-
tion control devices.3 2 Because the farmers had no commercial in-
terest that fell within the economic area of developing air pollution
control devices,33 the farmers were not targets of the alleged con-
spiracy, and were not even on the "firing range.""
The direct injury test 5 focuses on the relationship between the
claimant and the antitrust violator. Generally, the claimant does
not have standing under the test if an intermediate victim sepa-
rates the claimant from the violator.38 The direct injury test is
analogous to the concept of privity, and forecloses claims of all but
the most closely related parties. Under the direct injury test, for
example, a supplier of refined asphalt had no standing to sue an
asphalt producer for alleged antitrust pricing violations37 because
the supplier was "too far removed from the direct injury" to the
buyer. 8
30. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
31. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 830.
32. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
33. 481 F.2d at 129.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 729-31 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Productive Inventions v. Trico Prods.
Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956); Loeb v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910).
36. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
37. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963).
38. 308 F.2d at 395. Frequently, the direct injury test is simply a labelling process that
denies standing to plaintiffs who fall into generally recognized categories, such as the in-
jured party's landlord or creditor. Compare, e.g., Calderone Enters. v. United Artists Thea-
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The zone of interests test borrows heavily from administrative
law principles of standing. The important public policies behind
antitrust cases make the cases similar to public interest suits chal-
lenging governmental actions.'0 Some courts have reasoned that
this public interest orientation justifies the application of the ad-
ministrative law approach to standing in antitrust actions. The
zone of interests test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that his
interests lie arguably within the zone of interests that the antitrust
laws protect.41 In Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,42 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that in-
vestment companies had standing to sue a gasoline supplier.' The
supplier's refusal to provide service station financing effectively
foreclosed the investors' ability to expand their operations by
building more gasoline stations."
The courts have applied these three tests in a variety of modi-
fied forms. Dissatisfaction with the various tests, however, has led
some courts to take a more sweeping approach. In Bravman v.
Basset Furniture Industries,5 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit adopted a balancing test that examihed
"many constant and variable factors [in the] factual matrix
presented by each case in light of the policies underlying the anti-
tre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), with Congress
Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957). Although the cases were factually
similar, the courts reached opposite results. In Calderone, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the lessor of a theatre lacked standing as a matter of
law to sue allegedly conspiring movie distributors. 454 F.2d at 1292. In Congress Bldg., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a contrary result, reasoning
that the directness of the injury was a factual issue. 246 F.2d at 587. See generally Berger &
Bernstein, supra note 2, at 819-24.
39. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit modified the zone of interests test in Chrysler Corp.
v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981), to include the
antitrust injury requirements set forth in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S.
477 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 50-57. The modified test is difficult to distin-
guish from the target area test.
40. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975).
41. Id.
42. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. at 1151-52.
44. Id.
45. 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
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trust laws."4 The Third Circuit recognized that "there is no talis-
manic test capable of resolving all section 4 standing problems.''47
Unfortunately, however, the Third Circuit's balancing test does lit-
tle to guide trial courts. The balancing test provides no principled
basis for deciding questions of standing,48 but rather requires an ad
hoc determination of standing. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has had opportunities to apply each of the various
tests, the Court has not evaluated the relative utility of the tests
for determining whether injured parties have standing to bring
treble damage actions.49
46. 552 F.2d at 99. See also Mid-West Paper Prods. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573
(3d Cir. 1979).
47. 552 F.2d at 99.
48. For example, the United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts
of Pennsylvania have applied the Bravman balancing test and reached opposite results on
similar facts. Compare McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982), and
Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982), with Shaw v. Russell Truck-
ing Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
J9. The Supreme Court recently noted the continuing confusion in antitrust standing
doctrines. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct.
897, 907-08 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 467 & n.12 (1982). In Blue
Shield, the Court explicitly avoided evaluating the available tests. Id.
Although the Court did not offer a black-letter rule to guide the lower courts, the Court in
Associated Gen. Contractors suggested that judges should analyze future antitrust standing
issues in light of the factors set forth in that case. 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 n.33. The Court,
however, did not delineate the relevant factors or limit the scope of lower court inquiries.
The decision suggests that the Court considered the following factors: allegations in the
complaint of a causal connection between the antitrust violation and the injury; antitrust
injury; directness of the injury, the plaintiff's suitability to enforce the public interest and
collect damages; the speculative character of the alleged damages; and the potential for du-
plicative recovery in unmanageable litigation. The Court's conclusion restates these con-
cerns. Id. at 913. These factors are no different than the considerations underlying the ex-
isting antitrust standing doctrines, however, and each major test meets the Supreme Court's
standards.
When the Court vacated the decision in Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 103 S. Ct. 1244
(1983), the Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration in light of
Associated Gen. Contractors. Associated Gen. Contractors, however, does not offer any new
guidelines for the Ninth Circuit to apply in Ostrofe. In fact, the Supreme Court in Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors expressly sidestepped the issue of "whether the direct victim of a
boycott, who suffers a type of injury unrelated to antitrust policy, may recover damages
when the ultimate purpose of the boycott is to restrain competition in the relevant economic
market." 103 S. Ct. at 910 n.44. Compare the Supreme Court's contemporaneous denial of
certiorari in Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983). The Supreme Court's action
left intact the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in In
re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Bichan v. Chemtron Corp., 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983), that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
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Antitrust Injury
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,50 the United States
Supreme Court established "antitrust injury" as a requirement for
treble damage recoveries. To satisfy the antitrust injury require-
ment, a plaintiff must suffer an "injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes the defendants' acts unlawful."51 In Brunswick, bowling al-
ley operators sued for damages allegedly resulting from Bruns-
wick's acquisition of competing bowling centers in violation of the
antitrust laws.52 The plaintiffs claimed that the local bowling cen-
ters would have gone out of business and that the plaintiffs' profits
would have increased if Brunswick had not acquired the centers.53
The Supreme Court denied recovery for the alleged injuries be-
cause the plaintiffs' lost profit opportunities were unrelated to the
potential anticompetitive effects of the wrongful acquisition and
thus were "of no concern to the antitrust laws."" The Court an-
nounced the general rule that the right to recover treble damages
depended on the plaintiff's proof of an antitrust injury.55
In Brunswick, the alleged basis of substantive liability was
Brunswick's predatory power over small bowling centers. The
plaintiffs, however, failed to meet the requirement that recoverable
damages must be traceable to the predatory conduct itself. The re-
covery of lost profits based on continued competition would have
been inconsistent with the goal of antitrust law, which is to foster
competition and discourage anticompetitive predation. 5 Although
the plaintiffs' lost opportunities were a direct result of Brunswick's
unlawful acquisitions, they "did not occur 'by reason of' that which
made the acquisitions unlawful. '57 Thus, a plaintiff has standing to
bring an antitrust suit. The Supreme Court's disposition of both cases suggests that the
Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe may have analyzed correctly each factor necessary to effectuate
antitrust policy, but nevertheless reached the wrong result by finding standing.
50. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
51. Id. at 489.
52. Id. at 480.
53. Id. at 481.
54. Id. at 487.
55. Id. at 489.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 13.
57. 429 U.S. at 488. See Page, supra note 19, at 470. The antitrust injury requirement
also may be phrased in economic terms: the plaintiff's injury must result from economic
349
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bring a treble damage suit if he has suffered a direct injury, but
can recover only if he has suffered an antitrust injury.
Distinguishing Antitrust Injury from Antitrust Standing
The plaintiff's ability to maintain an antitrust suit depends
solely upon the court's determination of antitrust standing. In the
analysis of standing, however, courts often consider the antitrust
injury requirement as well. 58 A court can dispose of the difficult
substantive determination of whether the plaintiff suffered an anti-
trust injury by finding that the plaintiff lacks standing. Conversely,
a decision that the plaintiff has not suffered the kind of injury that
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent allows a court to avoid
the complicated analysis required by the standing tests.
Analytical differences, however, distinguish the two concepts.
The concept of antitrust injury involves the substantive issue of
whether the plaintiff's claim parallels the purposes of the antitrust
laws.5 Standing doctrines involve the remoteness of an economic
injury and the propriety of allowing a specific party to sue for
treble damages.6 In fact, antitrust injury is another broad rule of
standing that defines the type of harm compensable under section
4.'1 A party who has not suffered an antitrust injury has no stand-
efficiency lost as a result of the defendant's acts. See Note, Antitrust Injury and Standing:
A Question of Legal Cause, 67 MwNN. L. Rav. 1011 (1983).
58. The Supreme Court recently demonstrated the manner in which antitrust the stand-
ing and antitrust injury analysis may be combined. In Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cali-
fornia State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983), the Court examined the policy
considerations underlying actions for treble damages as well as the issues of directness of
injury and the Brunswick antitrust injury requirement. See supra note 49.
59. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 836, 842; Page, supra note 19, at 497. See supra
text accompanying notes 50-57.
60. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897,
911 (1983); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 842; Page, supra note 19, at 497. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text. See also Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines:
An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 994-97 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Handler, Changing Trends]. See generally Handler, The Shift from
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual An-
titrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 24-31 (1971); Sherman, Antitrust Standing: From Loeb
to Malsmud, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 374 (1976).
61. Antitrust injury focuses on the type of harm suffered, rather than the defendant's
relationship with the plaintiff. Only injuries flowing directly from the economic dislocation
are recoverable under § 4. "[T]reble-damages recovery should be linked to the procompeti-
tion policy of the antitrust laws." Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482 (1982). See
350 [Vol. 25:341
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ing to sue for treble damages.2
Other considerations related to standing, such as the directness
of the injury and the relationship of the parties, further narrow the
field of potential plaintiffs by giving effect to other important poli-
cies. These considerations protect defendants from the risk of mul-
tiple liability, conserve the recoverable funds, and insulate the
courts from overly complex litigation. Courts disallow treble dam-
age suits by one party if the law seeks to protect a different party
more closely associated with the defendant, or if a suit by another
party would be a more effective use of section 4's deterrent
potential6 3
To attach too much importance to the labels "antitrust injury"
and "antitrust standing" is to fall into the same semantic trap that
has surrounded the standing analysis. The insignificance of the la-
bel is manifested by the results that courts have reached when
combining the analysis of antitrust injury and antitrust standing."
But the dismissal of an antitrust suit on the basis of the plaintiff's
lack of standing, without an explanation that clarifies the policies
underlying standing doctrines, 5 perpetuates the uncertainty sur-
Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1155,
1164 (1982).
62. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
63. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897,
911 (1983); Page, supra note 19, at 497-500.
64. Decisions in the wake of Brunswick have combined the antitrust injury and standing
tests, but retain elements of each as independent considerations. See, e.g., Associated Gen.
Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983); Weit v. Conti-
nental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982);
Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982
(1979). In Weit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly recog-
nized the irrelevance of the antitrust injury and standing labels, because the plaintiff had
established the required nexus between the defendant's actions and the resulting injuries.
641 F.2d at 469. See also Lupia, 586 F.2d at 1168.
Because legal analysis is essentially a process of classifying human behavior, the focus
must remain on the behavior rather than the labels. E. Lnv, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
RFmONING 1-6 (1949); Parker, The Unique Role of Language in the Judicial Process: After-
the-Fact Classifications of Human Behavior, in PROcEEDINGs OF THE SECOND SUMMER CON-
FERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION (Speech Comunication Ass'n) 209 (1981). See generally W.
PROBERT, LAW, LAN4GUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1972). If care is taken in considering all of
the appropriate characteristics of a proper antitrust plaintiff, then labelling the classifica-
tion as proving "antitrust injury" or "antitrust standing" will leave the result unchanged.
65. Professor Areeda discusses the apparent paradox of antitrust violations without inju-
ries and antitrust injuries without damages, concluding that proper exposition of the reasons
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rounding antitrust standing.
Whether courts consider the principles behind the doctrines of
standing or antitrust injury, a decision that the plaintiff lacked
standing or did not suffer an antitrust injury leads to the same
result." Courts should allow a plaintiff to recover under section 4,
therefore, only after determining that the plaintiff has suffered a
direct antitrust injury to his business or property as a result of the
defendant's anticompetitive conduct.
EMPLOYEE STANDING
Terminated employees have faced antitrust standing issues in
several contexts. Antitrust cases involving improperly discharged
employees often follow a simple pattern in which the employee ref-
uses to participate in an employer's illegal antitrust scheme. Acting
alone or on the advice of coconspirators, the employer fires the re-
calcitrant employee. Seeking compensation and retribution for los-
ing his job, the employee brings a treble damage action.
Earlier decisions that purport to establish general rules for em-
ployee treble damage actions are factually distinguishable from
cases involving improperly discharged employees.6 7 An examina-
behind the ruling can dissolve the apparent paradox. Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without
Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1127 (1976). The Supreme Court in Brunswick noted
that the plaintiff could not recover for injuries against which the antitrust laws did not
protect. 429 U.S. at 487.
66. Eventually, one term should be selected to describe the criteria by which courts deter-
mine proper party plaintiffs under § 4. "Antitrust injury" is a workable phrase because a
plaintiff must not only suffer an injury in fact, but an injury cognizable under the policies of
antitrust law. In this sense, antitrust injury may be analogous to the tort concept of proxi-
mate cause. See Note, supra note 57. Antitrust injury also avoids confusing antitrust stand-
ing concerns with the issues resolved by other substantive standing doctrines. "Antitrust
standing," on the other hand, readily lends itself to generic application, as it describes a
variety of unconnected considerations. As the compositional elements of injury and standing
are rid of their respective labels to form a comprehensive pattern of analysis, a plaintiff who
lacked any of the elements could be described as "without standing."
This Note refers to the concept as "standing," except when specific reference is made to
the Brunswick analysis. The terminated employee faces none of the traditional standing
barriers of other injured parties, such as indirectness of injury or inadequate representation.
The question essentially revolves around the Brunswick criteria: whether the injury is of the
type that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and whether the injury flows from
unlawful antitrust behavior.
67. E.g., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973);
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tion of the facts of the earlier cases, however, reveals the develop-
ment of antitrust standing doctrines that also arise in antitrust
suits by discharged employees. A comparison of the cases illumi-
nates the inadequacy of the existing analysis and the need to de-
velop a new approach that meets the unique facts surrounding the
termination of law-abiding employees.
Employee Treble Damage Suits for an Employer's Antitrust
Injuries
Employees have sought to use section 4 treble damage suits to
recover lost wages resulting from the harm that their employer suf-
fered from another party's antitrust violation. 8 Employees usually
seek recovery of lost wages resulting from the injured company's
inability to pay the employee because of the company's lost busi-
ness or profits. As early as 1942, corporate employees had standing
to recover damages for lost salaries resulting from the diminished
sales income of their employer."" The employer, of course, suffered
the direct harm and had a right to sue the antitrust violator on its
own behalf. The court's recognition of standing for employees,
however, required an expansion of the direct injury requirement.
By acknowledging the special interest of the employee in regular
and continued employment, courts linked the employer's injuries
directly to the employee's business interests.70
As the direct injury test became the primary test of antitrust
standing, courts developed a categorical approach to determine
Dailey v. Quality School Plan, 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co.,
125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942); Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
68. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 813.
69. Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942). See also Klein v. Sales-
Builders, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,600 (N.D. Ill. 1950); McWhirter v. Monroe Calc.
Mach. Co., 76 F. Supp. 456, 460 (W.D. Mo. 1948). Corporate shareholders and other credi-
tors traditionally have lacked standing to sue for injuries to the corporation. See Loeb v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910); Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at
815.
70. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v.
United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973), amended, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir.
1974) (granting standing to employee of antitrust victim).
In some cases, the plaintiff's employer was a participant in the antitrust scheme that
harmed the employee. Nonetheless, sales agents who lost income or accounts to their em-
ployer's coconspirator were able to recover. See, e.g., Vines v. General Outdoor Advertising
Co., 171 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1948); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1942).
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whether an injury was direct.7 1 Under the direct injury test, the
standing of an employee depended upon the court's scrutiny of the
working relationship and the court's willingness to categorize the
plaintiff as an independent businessman.7 2 The section 4 require-
ment that the plaintiff suffer an injury to his business or prop-
erty"3 ostensibly blocked many employee suits for treble dam-
ages.74 Independent contractors and commissioned sales agents
had standing, however, because their positions exceeded tradi-
tional employer-employee relationships.7 5
Employees also have sought to recover damages for loss of in-
come resulting from antitrust violations that diminish competition
in their employer's industry.76 After an unlawful merger or acquisi-
tion, the surviving corporation often discharges unneeded employ-
ees. Terminated commissioned sales agents have recovered treble
damages in some cases, but courts have found that other employ-
ees performing similar tasks lacked standing.77 Both employees
and commissioned sales agents lose the opportunity to sell their
labor because of an illegal merger, however, and one injury is no
less direct than the other. 8 Categorizing the plaintiff as a sales
71. See supra note 26 and text accompanying notes 35-36.
72. See, e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
74. Compare Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.) (no standing for corporate
officer as an employee), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), and Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.) (salaried employees are not "quasi-businessmen"), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 938 (1973), with Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.) (dic-
tum characterizing plaintiff as agent rather than employee, thus allowing standing), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977), and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967)
(commissioned sales employee granted standing).
75. See, e.g., Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bowen v.
Wohl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
76. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 822.
77. Both Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
938 (1973), and Dailey v. Quality School Plan, 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967), involved em-
ployees discharged after mergers. The courts reached opposite results on the standing issue.
78. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 822-23. Successful arguments by employee plain-
tiffs often stretch the nature of the employment relationship far beyond its usual scope. See,
e.g., Broyer v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193, 196 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (no standing as an
employee, but standing allowed for loss of sales commissions and bonuses as sales manager);
Bowen v. Wobl Shoe Co., 389 F. Supp. 572, 579 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (loss of salary impaired
entrepreneurial capacity of plaintiff). A Seventh Circuit decision found impairment of a
business indistinguishable from loss of employment, but the case involved an illegal no-
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agent rather than an employee is an unsatisfactory method of de-
termining standing because it ignores the policies underlying the
antitrust laws and the considerations underlying antitrust stand-
ing. Unless an employee can demonstrate that his termination in-
jured an independent business or commercial interest, however,
courts usually will rely on precedent and find that a mere em-
ployee lacks standing to sue an antitrust violator.
Employee Suits Involving Employer Boycotts
Courts also have granted standing to employees subjected to
boycotts or blacklisting by employers. Group boycotts directed at a
single employee or trader are illegal per se under substantive pro-
visions of the antitrust laws.79 Similarly, employees have standing
to sue for treble damages based on their lost wages after being vic-
timized by agreements among violators not to hire former employ-
ees of a coconspirator.80 Courts also have allowed former employ-
ees of nonconspiring competitors to sue for treble damages after
being denied employment with the antitrust conspirators because
of their past employment.81
Cases involving the direct application of illegal restraints against
one or more employees do not involve a complicated standing anal-
ysis. When a party intentionally engages in anticompetitive activ-
ity against specific parties, the victims have standing to sue the
violator. The requirements of antitrust injury clearly are satisfied,
giving the victims standing to bring treble damage actions. If an
employee is not the object of the anticompetitive conduct, how-
switching agreement that resulted in an industry boycott of the plaintiff. Nichols v. Spencer
Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1967).
79. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951); Quinonez v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976).
Per se violations stem from "agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue" are presumed unreasonable and
illegal. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
80. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967). Such agreements com-
monly are called "no-switching agreements."
81. In Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), for example, National
Football League owners refused to hire a player who had competed in the rival All-Ameri-
can Conference football league. The Supreme Court held that the player had standing to
challenge the conspiracy to monopolize professional football through player boycotts. Id. at
448.
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ever, the situation is different. Without an independent illegal re-
straint of trade to create grounds for standing, the policies under-
lying antitrust laws come into play, and courts must consider the
remoteness and antitrust nature of the injury in deciding whether
the employee has standing to sue under the antitrust laws.
Victims of conduct that furthers an unlawful restraint of trade
have standing to challenge the overall anticompetitive scheme in
cases involving a unilateral or conspiratorial refusal to deal.82 For
example, replacing one exclusive distributor with another is not
necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws,8 but cancelling the
first distribution agreement at the urging of a competing distribu-
tor is a violation. 4 Similarly, cancelling a distributorship because
the distributor refuses to participate in a resale price-fixing scheme
gives the distributor standing to sue for treble damages based on
the overall conspiracy.8 5 To constitute an antitrust violation, the
unilateral action need not amount to a total refusal to deal. Even
the disruption of contractual expectations can generate antitrust
liability."
Employees victimized by hiring boycotts, as well as displaced
distributors, should have standing to bring treble damage actions.
The plaintiff in Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co.,8 7 for example,
was an independent jobber victimized by an antitrust conspiracy to
close the market to independents. Lee-Moore had standing not
only because it was discharged in furtherance of the illegal conspir-
acy, but because as a jobber it suffered the effects that the viola-
tors had intended-the closing of the field to all independent
82. See Engine Specialties v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979) (plaintiff-dis-
tributor could challenge manufacturers' agreement to allocate territory because result of al-
location was plaintiff's termination), aff'd per curiam on reh'g, 615 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 599 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.
1979) (discharged jobber allowed to sue on the basis of a conspiracy to drive out maverick
jobbers). See also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (distributorship cancelled
because of plaintiff's refusal to adhere to fixed price).
83. Engine Specialties v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1979), aff'd per curiam
on reh'g, 615 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980).
84. Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
85. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
86. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970); Hoopes v. Union Oil
Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967).
87. 599 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1979).
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jobbers.""
Although displaced distributors and discharged employees suffer
similar injuries, the causes of their injuries differ. The displace-
ment of distributors is often the goal of an illegal antitrust scheme.
The antitrust violator seeks to increase its own profits by destroy-
ing the competing firms. The displaced distributor suffers a direct
injury from the scheme and comes within the target area of in-
tended economic restriction. In contrast, the employees of a viola-
tor discharged in furtherance of an anticompetitive scheme are not
the intended objects of the anticompetitive activities. Employees
who refuse to participate in their employer's antitrust violations
are merely obstacles that the employer must remove. Two federal
circuit courts, however, have responded differently to cases involv-
ing employees who lost their jobs for refusing to participate in an-
ticompetitive schemes.
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.
In Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit allowed a terminated employee to bring
a treble damage action against his former employer. Ostrofe was
Crocker's sales manager for paper lithograph labels.90 Ostrofe re-
fused to comply with his employer's demand that he rig bids, fix
prices, and aid in allocating territories.91 Crocker forced Ostrofe to
resign, and prevented him from finding further employment in the
labels industry.2 Although the district court originally upheld Os-
trofe's claim against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the
court later ruled against Ostrofe on the same issue on the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment.9 3 Finding a sufficient rela-
88. Id. at 1304-07.
89. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
90. 670 F.2d at 1380.
91. Id.
92. Id. The independent antitrust violation involved in the industry boycott of Ostrofe
might have given Ostrofe standing to sue his employer based on the overall anticompetitive
scheme. In this sense, the case is indistinguishable from Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See supra note 81. The issue of Ostrofe's right to sue for uni-
lateral discharge as part of Crocker's implementation of the antitrust scheme is a distinct
issue, and the court treated it as such. This Note addresses the standing of a terminated
employee, however, not the standing of a boycott victim.
93. 670 F.2d at 1381.
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tionship between the nature of the employer's wrongful acts and
the resulting harm to the plaintiff," the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court's order of summary judgment for the defendant.9 5
The Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe noted the confusion surrounding
antitrust standing and rejected a label-oriented approach. The
court's analysis of the standing issue purported to balance the im-
portance of section 4 actions in enforcing the antitrust policies
against the concerns of fairness and practicality that arise when
the number of antitrust cases expands.9 7 The court found that the
policy considerations tipped the scales in favor of allowing
standing.98
Noting that most antitrust schemes are covert, the Ninth Circuit
assumed that allowing discharged employees to sue for treble dam-
ages would encourage disclosure of antitrust violations.99 Manage-
rial employees such as Ostrofe, however, have little incentive to
disrupt their employer's unlawful schemes, even if they potentially
can recover treble damages. The paucity of cases demonstrates
that few plaintiffs are as altruistic as Ostrofe. Additionally, the
court offered no reason for its apparent belief that most sales or
middle management employees realize that an antitrust violation
is occurring when their employer orders changes in marketing
practices. 100 Moreover, nothing indicated that Ostrofe's complaints
led the Department of Justice to initiate an action against the con-
spiring paper label manufacturers. 10 1
Assuming that the antitrust scheme could not have succeeded
without the cooperation of all employees, the court reasoned that
allowing discharged employees to seek treble damages would give
94. Id. at 1388.
95. Id. at 1389.
96. Id. at 1382-83.
97. Id. at 1383-84.
98. Id. at 1386.
99. Id. at 1384. See also Berger & Bernstein, supra note 2, at 847 n.172.
100. The court suggested that no conspiracy can be effective without the cooperation of
responsible employees. 670 F.2d at 1384. The court, however, failed to explain why partici-
pating sales agents or managers necessarily would be aware of the conspiracy. They might
simply be following orders without being included in the planning of the scheme.
101. See United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,883 (N.D. Cal.
1976); United States v. H.S. Crocker Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,615 (N.D. Cal.
1975). Consent decrees were entered without the taking of any testimony.
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them an incentive to resist an employer's unlawful directions and
would raise the stakes for the violators. 10 2 The court's conclusion is
speculative at best. An employer who decides to violate the federal
antitrust laws probably would not allow one recalcitrant employee
to foil the entire plan. The employer can use the employee in a
chpacity that will not hamper the anticompetitive scheme, thereby
avoiding liability to the employee. Of course, retention of the em-
ployee may result in liability if the employee conveys information
about the scheme to injured parties or to the government.
The Ninth Circuit also suggested that suits by discharged em-
ployees might prevent or mitigate injury to those who are the ulti-
mate objects of the anticompetitive scheme. 103 Not only did the
Ninth Circuit credit fired employees with an uncanny ability to
disrupt illegal schemes by immediately filing successful antitrust
suits,'0 but the court also overlooked the difficulties inherent in
litigating private treble damage actions. 0 5 Finally, the interest of a
discharged employee lies in proving the illegal termination of the
employment relationship, not in establishing an antitrust violation
that might have occurred after his discharge.
The court also concluded that the terminated employee suffers
an immediate and direct injury as a result of his employer's viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.106 According to the court, no plaintiff is
better qualified than the employee to sue for the antitrust damages
sustained by all victims of the conspiracy.10 7 This conclusion begs
102. 670 F.2d at 1384.
103. Id. As the dissent recognized, if the plaintiff was not the object of the conspiracy, he
would not have standing to challenge the violation. Id. at 1390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. 670 F.2d at 1384-85.
105. Studies indicate that the majority of successful civil antitrust suits follow Depart-
ment of Justice proceedings, especially if the private plaintiff can use a final judgment as res
judicata on the antitrust violation issue. See Note, Nolo Pleas in Antitrust Cases, 79 H.Rv.
L. REv. 1475, 1481 (1966). Unless the terminated employee participated in the conspiracy,
the burden of investigating and proving an antitrust violation may be overwhelming.
106. 670 F.2d at 1385.
107. Id. Chief Judge Browning cited the work of three commentators to support this ar-
gument. Id. at 1385 n.14. The commentators agree that the plaintiff in an antitrust suit
'should be the most proximate victim, but they do not address the issue of the standing of a
discharged employee. See P. ARENA & D. TURNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW § 334 (1978); Lytle &
Perdue, Antitrust Target Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of Standing
in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 Am. U.L. REv. 795, 801 (1976); Page, supra
note 19. Page views employees discharged in the course of a violation, such as post-merger
consolidation or changes in exclusive distributorships, as lacking standing because no net
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the question. The directness of the terminated employee's injury
was not at issue, nor was his right to recover some form of compen-
sation. The issues presented were whether the employer's action in
discharging the plaintiff violated the antitrust laws and, if so,
whether the court should allow the plaintiff to bring a treble dam-
age suit. The court did not address these issues.
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that granting standing to Os-
trofe would involve none of the adverse consequences usually pre-
sent in cases addressing standing under section 4, such as broaden-
ing the defendant's liability or generating a flood of litigation.108 If
allowing suits by improperly discharged employees will not dra-
matically increase the amount of antitrust litigation, however, the
deterrent effect of allowing such suits is questionable. Assuming
that antitrust schemes usually remain undetected, employee suits
may be so infrequent as to present an insignificant deterrent to
antitrust violators. Additionally, discharged employees can recover
at most only three times their employment-related damages, not
three times the antitrust profits reaped by their employer.109 Be-
cause these potential damage awards usually are not large enough
to offset the potential profit of an antitrust scheme, employee suits
have little deterrent effect.
Judge Kennedy's dissenting opinion110 criticized the majority for
abandoning the target area test, the then prevailing test for anti-
trust standing in the Ninth Circuit.1 In his view, the illegal re-
straint of trade in the labels industry did not injure the plaintiff,
whose interests were not within the target area of the economy en-
decline in economic efficiency has occurred. Id. at 498.
108. 670 F.2d at 1385. See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Calder-
one Enters. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
109. Section 4 provides a remedy only for damages to the plaintiff's business or property.
Assuming that the employee has a business or property interest that § 4 protects, the dam-
age to the business or property interest is measured by his lost wages. The employer makes
no illicit profits at the direct expense of the employee. Thus, illicit profits are not the proper
measure of damages.
110. 670 F.2d at 1389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
111. The court originally adopted the target area test in Conference of Studio Unions v.
Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952), and reaf-
firmed the test as a "logical and flexible tool" in In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
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dangered by the violation. 112 Under the target area test, Ostrofe
lacked standing to bring an antitrust action because his employ-
ment interest was not within the economic sphere that the conspir-
acy sought to exploit.
The dissent also distinguished Ostrofe's injuries from antitrust
injuries. Ostrofe's injuries were outside the competitive area that
his employer sought to restrict.11 s Focusing on the antitrust injury
requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,114 the dissent would have granted standing
to discharged employees only if the antitrust violation restricted
the labor market.11 5
Unfortunately, the dissent's position unnecessarily narrowed the
Brunswick analysis. The dissent read Brunswick as limiting anti-
trust standing under section 4 to competitors of the employer.""8
The Brunswick analysis does not support the conclusion that only
competitors can suffer antitrust injuries, nor do subsequent deci-
sions by the Supreme Court support such a limitation.117 The dis-
sent apparently determined the affected area of the economy by
considering the economic areas in which the violator's competitors
operated instead of defining the affected area without regard to the
competitors.118
The target area analysis does not resolve the controversy sur-
rounding standing. Ostrofe may have been part of the labels indus-
try and a potential, if unforeseen, target of the conspiracy. Crock-
er's decision to fire Ostrofe, however, differed substantively from
its decision to commit an antitrust violation. The critical issue is
whether the economic breakdown injured Ostrofe in a manner that
"'the antitrust laws were designed to protect.' "119 The majority's
interpretation of Brunswick and the antitrust injury component of
112. 670 F.2d at 1390 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
114. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
115. 670 F.2d at 1391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1389.
117. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 909-10 (1983); Blue Shield v. McCready, 465 U.S. 477, 481-84 (1982). The Court
in Blue Shield noted that the dampening of competition was only one type of injury that
§ 4 may redress. Id. at 482-83.
118. 670 F.2d at 1389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
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standing were the foundations for the policy analysis that led the
Ninth Circuit to grant standing in Ostrofe.120
In Ostrofe, the majority concluded that the antitrust injury re-
quirement enunciated in Brunswick was broad enough to allow re-
covery of damages for indirect injuries caused by the anticompeti-
tive effects of an antitrust violation.121 The Ninth Circuit reached
this conclusion although several earlier appellate decisions had in-
terpreted Brunswick more narrowly. 22 The court recognized that
the Supreme Court in Brunswick sought to extend section 4 reme-
dies only to plaintiffs whose recovery would serve the substantive
purposes underlying the antitrust laws. 123 As the Court made clear
in Brunswick, Congress intended that the treble damage remedy
open the door for consumer antitrust actions,2 4 even though the
antitrust laws were designed primarily to protect competition.1 25
The Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe was sensitive to both of these
goals.12
8
Unable to find that Ostrofe had standing based on the primary
120. 670 F.2d at 1386.
121. Id. at 1387.
122. See John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court in Ostrofe did not mention Lenore, which held that a former beer distributor lacked
standing to sue for treble damages resulting from his discharge in the course of the defen-
dant's allegedly unlawful acquisitions and attempted monopoly. See also Weit v. Continen-
tel Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988
(1982); Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 982 (1979). Additionally, the court in Ostrofe noted, without discussion, several pre-
Brunswick cases supporting an opposite conclusion. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pol-
lution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Morgan v. Automobile
Mfrs. Ass'n- 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51
(9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952). See also GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co.,
463 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). Without addressing the
effect of Brunswick on the issue of antitrust standing, the court in Ostrofe relied on claimed
support from two earlier decisions, Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), and Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th
Cir. 1967). The applicability of these cases after Brunswick is questionable; they are factu-
ally distinguishable from the discharged employee situation in Ostrofe.
123. 670 F.2d at 1387. "Antitrust injury" does not provide a method of neatly categorizing
all parties who eventually will benefit from the prevention of anticompetitive behavior. The
pl~rase links the plaintiff's recovery to the type of harm that flows from an antitrust
violation.
124. 429 U.S. at 486 n.10. The Court reached its conclusion based on an analysis of the
congressional debate over the original treble damage provision. Id. at 485-86.
125. Id. at 488 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
126. 670 F.2d at 1387.
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purpose of the antitrust laws, the Ninth Circuit looked for a secon-
dary purpose. The court reasoned that the provisions for individ-
ual criminal liability demonstrated Congress' concern for individ-
ual conduct.127  Even if Ostrofe had participated in the
anticompetitive scheme only to the extent of fulfilling his employ-
ment duties, he might have been criminally liable.128 The court
reasoned that the congressional concern with punishing and deter-
ring "bad" conduct by individuals justified rewarding "good" be-
havior by permitting a treble damage recovery.120 This conclusion,
however, hinged on the unsupported assertion that Ostrofe's coop-
eration was essential to the success of the anticompetitive
scheme. 30 Additionally, if Ostrofe was an effective impediment to
the anticompetitive plan, no antitrust violation could have oc-
curred until after he was fired. Ostrofe could not have suffered an
antitrust injury, therefore, if no antitrust violation occurred until
after his discharge.
The court's conclusion that "[t]hese facts disclose the 'intimate
relationship between circumstances which make the wrongdoer's
conduct unlawful and the resulting harm which is the subject of
the suit,' required by Brunswick"13 does not follow from the anal-
ysis. Crocker's unlawful conduct consisted of price-fixing arrange-
ments which restrained competition and injured customers; the
subject of Ostrofe's claim was his discharge. Although the parties
were intimately related as employer and employee, Brunswick re-
quires the presence of some relationship between the anticompeti-
tive acts and the injuries sued upon.13 2 That nexus was not present
in Ostrofe, and a more accurate reading of Brunswick would have
led the court to deny Ostrofe standing to sue for treble damages.3 3
127. Id. Criminal liability for antitrust violations is specified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
128. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
129. 670 F.2d at 1387-88.
130. Id. at 1388. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
131. 670 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Handler, Changing Trends, supra note 60, at 990).
132. 429 U.S. at 489.
133. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania recently
adopted the view of antitrust injury articulated in Ostrofe. In Shaw v. Russell Trucking
Line, 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982), a trucker who was discharged for refusing to par-
ticipate in an overloading scheme had standing to sue his former employer under the federal
antitrust laws. Finding questionable support in two pre-Brunswick cases decided by the
Third Circuit, the district court adopted the analysis in Ostrofe without explanation. Id. at
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In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation
In In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation,1 34 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided that a dis-
charged employee did not have standing to sue under section 4.
Chemetron Corp. fired its employee, Bichan, from his position in
Chemetron's gas division after he began a marketing program to
compete for customers previously served by other producers.13 5
Bichan sued Chemetron, alleging that an anticompetitive conspir-
acy existed among gas producers, and that he was fired for refusing
to participate in the price-fixing scheme. s3 The court held that be-
cause the labor market was not the object of the restraint of trade,
Bichan had not suffered an antitrust injury.13 7
In the first part of its two-step analysis of standing,"3 8 the court
examined whether Bichan's termination was an antitrust injury, as
required by Brunswick. e39 In the second part of the analysis, the
court considered whether Bichan was the proper party to bring a
treble damage suit.140 The court reasoned that it should allow anti-
trust standing only to plaintiffs who had suffered antitrust injuries
780. Although claiming to apply the balancing test used by the Third Circuit, see supra text
accompanying notes 45-48, the court simply accepted the "balance of competing policy con-
siderations" in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. 542 F. Supp. at 780.
The district court cited two cases to support its decision that the discharged trucker had
standing. Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
823 (1977), involved a former distributor-sales agent who was the object of an illegal re-
straint of trade. In dicta, the Third Circuit found standing and characterized the plaintiff as
more of an agent than an employee. Id. at 96 n.7. In International Aas'n of Heat & Frost
Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1973),
amended, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit granted standing to the employee
of an antitrust victim. Given the factual context of Shaw, the district court's reliance on
these cases was misplaced.
134. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp., 103
S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
135. 681 F.2d at 515.
186. Id.
137. Id. at 517.
138. Id. at 515.
139. See 429 U.S. 489. See also Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 641 F.2d
457 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982).
140. The Seventh Circuit cited Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Although
not technically a decision concerning standing, Illinois Brick did address the necessity of
choosing among many injured parties to find a proper antitrust plaintiff. 431 U.S. at 728 n.7.
In In re Industrial Gas, the issue was the remoteness of the plaintiff's injury, a traditional
standing consideration. 681 F.2d at 519.
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and whose treble damage suits effectively achieved the deterrent
goal of the antitrust laws.141
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's use of a balancing test, the
Seventh Circuit used a target area analysis to decide whether
Bichan had suffered an antitrust injury.14 2 Bichan asserted that he
had standing to sue for treble damages based on employee boycott
cases.1 43 Discharged employees in those cases, however, had stand-
ing only because their injuries resulted from the anticompetitive
conduct itself. Unlike Bichan, boycotted employees were victims of
conspiracies to restrain labor markets.1 44 An antitrust injury flow-
ing from the violator's restraints on competition in the labor mar-
ket falls within the scope of the target area analysis.1 45 The target
area test, therefore, distinguishes between unfair treatment of em-
ployees and anticompetitive conduct directed toward them.1 "
Bichan claimed that his actions increased competition and that
the conspiracy would have ended if he had not been discharged. 147
The Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe accepted this argument,1 48 but the
141. 681 F.2d at 516.
142. Id. at 517. The leading target area decisions in the Seventh Circuit that also ac-
knowledged the antitrust injury analysis were Weit v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982), and Lupia v. Stella
D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). The type
of test applied to determine standing, however, should not lead to the different outcomes
reached by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See also Nich-
ols v. Spencer Int'l Press, 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Although McNulty was not dismissed on a pretrial challenge to
the plaintiff's standing, the court denied his post-trial motions for judgment. The distict
court recognized that although loss of employment was an injury to business or property
under § 4, Brunswick required a more thorough analysis. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 655, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (effectively reversing the previous opinion). The second opin-
ion, which found that McNulty lacked standing, considered Ostrofe but refused to extend
the concept of standing to embrace the antitrust injury requirement without guidance from
the Supreme Court or the Third Circuit. Id. at 661. The Seventh Circuit in In re Industrial
Gas also distinguished the first McNulty decision. 681 F.2d at 518 n.4.
144. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). See supra note 81
for a discussion of Radovich.
145. See Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 982 (1979).
146. 586 F.2d at 1169.
147. 681 F.2d at 518.
148. 670 F.2d at 1388.
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Seventh Circuit rejected it. 149 More importantly, even if Bichan
could have affected the conspiracy, his ability to promote competi-
tion was irrelevant in determining whether he suffered an antitrust
injury.150 Antitrust injuries must flow from the lessening of compe-
tition. Congress provided for treble damage suits to promote eco-
nomic competition, 51 not to protect employment. 52 The possibil-
ity that Bichan's continued employment also might have promoted
competition did not entitle him to standing to sue for treble dam-
ages. Although Bichan may have acted in the public interest, the
policies limiting the scope of recovery under section 4 led to the
conclusion that Bichan did not suffer an antitrust injury. 153
The Seventh Circuit found that no antitrust policy supported
Bichan's assertion of standing. The Seventh Circuit rejected the
holding in Ostrofe,5 and found that the majority in Ostrofe ig-
nored the teaching of Brunswick: the anticompetitive effects of the
violation must cause an antitrust injury.1 55 The court interpreted
Brunswick as holding that the purpose of section 4 is to protect
people injured as consumers or competitors in the marketplace or
in the discrete area of the economy affected by the anticompetitive
scheme. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit refused to
extend antitrust standing to all persons who are remotely affected
by violations of the antitrust laws.1 56
Congress enacted the antitrust laws to foster competition, not to
prevent employee discharges.1 57 Although Congress may have in-
149. 681 F.2d at 518.
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
152. In re Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519; Ostrofe, 670 F.2d at 1392 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
153. 681 F.2d at 515. See also Parmalee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961). To read § 4 literally as providing a remedy for every
economic dislocation would lead to a morass of complex suits for injuries unrelated to the
social cost of the violation. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977). Because of this danger, courts should expand the treble damage remedy only after a
clear indication of congressional intent to do so. Id. (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405
U.S. 251, 264 (1972)).
154. 681 F.2d at 519. The Seventh Circuit approved of the "reasoned analysis" of Judge
Kennedy in his dissent in Ostrofe. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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tended to benefit a large portion of the economically active popula-
tion, only those parties suffering an antitrust injury have standing
to pursue a section 4 right of action. Persons collaterally affected
by antitrust violations must rely on the procompetitive results of
suits by plaintiffs who suffer direct antitrust injuries. 15 8 The con-
gressional concern with protecting competition requires more than
a tenuous relationship between the antitrust violation and the in-
jury. Only an injury resulting from the anticompetitive effects of
the violation merits a treble damage recovery.159 Bichan's injury
did not result directly from his employer's anticompetitive prac-
tices and did not constitute an antitrust injury. Additionally, the
remoteness of the relationship between Bichan's termination and
the intended harmful effects of the anticompetitive scheme pre-
vented Bichan from being an effective enforcer of the antitrust
laws. ee Injured consumers or competitors of the conspirators fur-
ther the policies of the antitrust laws effectively because they re-
cover three times the illegal profits made by the violators."'e Con-
sumers and competitors are the appropriate antitrust plaintiffs,
therefore, because their treble damage actions are a greater deter-
rent to parties who undertake anticompetitive activities. e2
The Seventh Circuit retreated from the Brunswick analysis in
the final portion of its opinion. Attempting to bolster its decision
by building on the notion of remoteness, the court undercut the
logic of its initial analysis. l 3 Even if Bichan had suffered an anti-
trust injury, the court nevertheless would have denied standing be-
158. Id. at 520.
159. Id. at 519; see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
160. 681 F.2d at 518-20.
161. Id. at 520.
162. Id. Several courts have taken the same approach, although not all of them have re-
lied on In re Industrial Gas. See RJM Sales & Mktg. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp.
1368 (D. Minn. 1982) (terminated distributor had no standing to challenge tying arrange-
ment because injury was not caused by the anticompetitive activity); McNulty v. Borden,
Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (because Third Circuit has not extended standing as
far as the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff must prove injury resulting from economic effects of the
violation); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (section 4 is not an
employee discharge remedy); Booth v. Radio Shack Div., Tandy Corp., 1982-83 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,001 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employee's complaints, not the antitrust violation, caused
termination); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (rejecting
Ostrofe's policy analysis in favor of existing Seventh Circuit precedent).
163. 681 F.2d at 519.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cause Bichan's injury was too far removed from the defendant's
illegal conduct.'" Traditional concepts of antitrust standing sup-
port this conclusion. 165 The court, however, cited cases following
the categorization approach to support its analysis, rather than ex-
amining the policies underlying antitrust standing.'
The proper concern of the antitrust standing analysis is the
plaintiff's ability to enforce efficiently the policies underlying the
antitrust laws. The Seventh Circuit noted that efficient enforce-
ment is determined by balancing the interests of deterrence and
redress against the goal of avoiding excessive treble damage litiga-
tion. 167 By relying on the categorization approach, the Seventh Cir-
cuit ignored the necessary policy considerations inherent in the de-
termination of antitrust standing. A policy analysis is an essential
part of the antitrust standing determination. The issue of the
plaintiff's remoteness from the anticompetitive scheme and its ef-
fect on the plaintiff's capacity to enforce effectively the policies of
the antitrust laws should complement the policy analysis, not serve
as an alternative basis for determining antitrust standing.
Fortunately, the Seventh Circuit did not rely solely on the cate-
gorization approach and found a more appropriate method of
choosing "the select class of plaintiffs that can impose the deter-
rent sting of treble damages at the smallest cost of enforce-
ment."'68 The anticompetitive effects of Chemetron's antitrust vio-
lation did not cause Bichan's injury.6 9 Aside from the antitrust
injury requirement, Bichan's suit would not have served the policy
goals that suits by other section 4 plaintiffs would serve. Allowing
discharged employees to bring antitrust actions would increase the
volume of antitrust litigation without any concomitant deterrent
benefit.17 0 The employee's right to a remedy should not override
the inherent limitations of the substantive scope of antitrust poli-
164. Id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
166. 681 F.2d at 519 (reciting the general rules concerning "stockholders, employees and
creditors").
167. Id. at 520.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 519.
170. Id. See also Calderone Enters. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
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cies.17 ' An alternative remedy for discharged employees is a more
reasonable solution because improper expansion of the antitrust
laws dilutes the laws' ability to protect competition effectively. Un-
less Congress extends the reach of section 4, therefore, discharged
employees should remain outside its remedial scope.17 2
REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES
The Seventh Circuit's analysis in In re Industrial Gas better re-
flects the post-Brunswick limitations of antitrust standing.17 3 The
analysis in In re Industrial Gas and Brunswick, however, failed to
resolve one issue raised in Ostrofe. In Ostrofe, the employer fired
the plaintiff for refusing to participate in illegal conduct. 74 More-
over, the employee's conduct furthered the public policies favoring
competitive behavior and discouraged participation in illegal activ-
ities. Failing to construe the standing rules more broadly raises
questions concerning the remedy that discharged employees should
seek.
In Ostrofe, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the enforcement ef-
fects of allowing discharged employees to sue under section 4 out-
weighed the countervailing considerations of subjecting defendants
to multiple litigation. 75 The dissent suggested, however, that an-
other remedy would serve the goal of deterrence more effec-
tively. 76 The dissent argued that the employee who was discharged
for refusing to participate in an antitrust violation should have a
cause of action for wrongful discharge. 7 7
The law of wrongful discharge is developing rapidly and disal-
171. 681 F.2d at 520. See also Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
172. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; In re Industrial Gas, 681 F.2d at 519. If the number of
discharged employees promises to make them efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, Con-
gress may extend the scope of § 4 expressly to include suits by discharged employees.
173. Page, supra note 19, at 468. See also In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681
F.2d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub noma. Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. 103 S. Ct.
126 (1983); Handler, Changing Trends, supra note 60, at 995, 997.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
175. 670 F.2d at 1384.
176. Id. at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Id. Wrongful discharge is a more accurate characterization of the facts in Ostrofe
and In re Industrial Gas. The employees were discharged for a wrongful or improper pur-
pose. Characterizing the discharges as injuries suffered as a result of the employers' an-
ticompetitive activities, however, is unreasonable.
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lowing discharged employees a treble damage remedy may en-
courage its development. 17 s Denying plaintiffs such as Ostrofe an
antitrust remedy will force the states to develop appropriate alter-
native remedies. If federal courts expand section 4 standing to in-
clude discharged employees, they might interfere with the develop-
ment of the wrongful discharge action.'1 e Although the dissent's
concerns in Ostrofe with federal judicial interference with the state
law of wrongful discharge may be exaggerated, those concerns are
not specious.180
Increasingly, state courts are recognizing actions for wrongful
discharge.' California, where the Ostrofe controversy originated,
has recognized that discharged employees like Ostrofe have a cause
of action for wrongful discharge. 82 In Tameny v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 53 for example, a case involving facts similar to Ostrofe,
the California Supreme Court held that the employee's wrongful
discharge gave rise to a cause of action in tort, thus entitling the
employee to recover punitive damages. In Tameny, the court al-
lowed a wrongful discharge action by a retail sales representative
discharged for refusing to participate in a price-fixing scheme.'"
Although only a few jurisdictions have followed California's lead,
the number is increasing.185
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. But see 670 F.2d at 1384 n.12.
181. Id. at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27
Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty To Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1816, 1821-24 (1980); Comment, Protecting the Private Sector At Will Employee Who
"Blows the Whistle". A Cause of Action Based Upon Determinants of Public Policy, 1977
Wis. L. REv. 777.
182. 670 F.2d at 1392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
183. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
184. Id. at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal.'Rptr. at 846.
185. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Trombetta v.
Detroit, T. & I.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210,
536 P.2d 512 (1975); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). See gener-
ally Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exer-
cise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Note, Non-Statutory Causes of
Action for an Employer's Termination of an "At Will" Employment Relationship: A Possi-
ble Solution to the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 743 (1979).
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A discussion of the advantages of developing a wrongful dis-
charge remedy through state law is beyond the scope of this Note.
If discharged employees like Ostrofe have neither an alternative
remedy nor standing to bring an antitrust action, however, they
will have no remedy for the wrong that they have suffered. This
possibility concerned the court in Ostrofe. The Ninth Circuit de-
cided that regardless of the state law concerning wrongful dis-
charge, discharged employees had standing to seek treble damages
under section 4.181 The dissent in Ostrofe insisted that the wrong-
ful discharge remedy precluded the federal remedy,187 and argued
that federal interference in an 'area of state concern was
unwarranted. 18
The Supreme Court's opinion in Brunswick did not suggest that
exceptions to the antitrust injury rule existed.18 9 In fact, the Court
explicitly refused to extend the scope of antitrust protection with-
out an express mandate from Congress. 190 Courts should not
stretch the rationale underlying the federal antitrust laws when
state law can provide an appropriate remedy. Without a congres-
sional mandate clearly articulating the public purposes of the anti-
trust laws, even less reason exists to distort the scope of section 4.
CONCLUSION
As a class, employees asserting a claim for treble damages under
section 4 of the Clayton Act have faced a variety of impediments
to standing. Employees discharged in the course of their employ-
ers' illegal antitrust schemes must satisfy not only the traditional
direct injury or target area requirements of standing, but also must
prove that they have suffered an antitrust injury. A close reading
of the antitrust injury doctrine, along with a consideration of the
remedial and deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws, reveals that
discharged employees should not have standing to sue under sec-
tion 4.
186. 670 F.2d at 1384 n.12.
187. Id. at 1389-92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1392. The Seventh Circuit in In re Industrial Gas did not address the state
law issue, except to mention the possible availability of a state law remedy. 681 F.2d at 520.
189. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
190. Id. at 488.
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Only a cavalier analysis of the antitrust policies and an expan-
sion of the antitrust injury rule support a grant of standing to dis-
charged employees. Without a clear expression of congressional in-
tent that section 4 encompasses these plaintiffs, little justification
exists for finding that they have antitrust standing. Moreover, the
emerging right of action for wrongful discharge is an appropriate
remedy for the injuries that discharged employees suffer. An em-
ployer's anticompetitive acts ordinarily do not injure discharged
employees, and employees do not suffer the type of injuries that
the antitrust laws were designed to prevent. The harmful effect
that makes an employer's anticompetitive acts unlawful does not
include the harm that results from a wrongful discharge. The dis-
charge may be a means of advancing an illegal scheme, but the
discharge itself is not an antitrust violation. This distinction is es-
sential to the antitrust standing analysis, and is worth preserving.
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